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Roberto Frega’s Pragmatism and the Wide View of Democracy marks an ambitious attempt 
to construct a comprehensive and critical vision of democratic theory, a vision that draws 
together elements from pragmatism, from sociological theory, and from critical theory. 
Responding to the pervasive sense of crisis that surrounds democracy, Frega persuasively 
argues, requires broadening our understanding of the concept’s scope. Frega seeks to move 
beyond two prominent conceptions of democracy in contemporary democratic theory. First, 
there are those who subscribe to an exclusively institutional concept of democracy (which 
includes most mainstream political scientists, for example) as consisting in a more or less 
extensive set of procedures that support popular self-rule. To the extent that this group 
explicitly thinks of the normative dimension of democracy at all, it does so in terms of the 
instrumental value of certain procedural features, such as competitive elections, the rule of 
law, and liberal rights of speech and association (e.g., Przeworski 2019). The other mode of 
thinking about democracy that Frega repudiates locates it within a philosophical ontology of 
the political and is more inclined to appreciate the non-instrumental value of democracy, but 
tends to view democracy as a special form of collective agency restricted to certain practices, 
actors or moments of exceptional creativity (e.g., Wolin 2016).  
 
In their place, Frega develops a theory which is underpinned by a fusion of pragmatism, 
critical theory, and sociological theory. He aims to show how a “pragmatist social ontology 
of democracy […] provides a solid basis for an ambitious attempt at reconstructing the whole 
domain of political normative theory around the concept of democracy” (63). The breadth of 
Frega’s scholarship is impressive, as is the energy with which he engages with a wide 
panorama of social theorising, and I am broadly sympathetic both to the philosophical 
taproots of this project and to the directions in which Frega takes it. Yet this is a very 
ambitious project and I am concerned that it doesn’t quite deliver on these ambitions in some 
important ways. After sketching the contours of his account, I will focus on what seem to me 
two important questions, attached to his claims about the social ontological basis of his 
democratic theory and to his account of the normative requirements of democracy. 
 
In much of its expository detail, Frega particularly draws on an interpretation of the 
pragmatist tradition of thinking about social and political theory, encompassing not only the 
work of John Dewey but also of a range of interlocutors and near contemporaries, such as 
Mary Parker Follett, Charles Cooley, and Arthur Bentley. At the core of this account is the 
famous Deweyan claim that we need “get rid of the habit of thinking of democracy as 
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something institutional and external and to acquire the habit of treating it as a way of 
personal life” (Dewey 1988 (1939): 228). This “wide view” of democracy as a way of life 
emphasises the everyday, social and pervasive character of democracy as well as its 
institutional mechanisms, viewing it as  “a norm whose fields of application are not only 
formal political institutions but all the patterns  of social interaction, the organizational forms, 
and the institutional arrangements that characterize a society from the micro level of primary 
associations to the macro level of its major social, economic and political institutions” (7). In 
identifying democracy with a set of everyday practices, Frega goes beyond the relatively 
familiar idea that democratic institutions or procedures require a certain kind of “ethos” or 
norms among citizens in order to be sustainable or to flourish. Rather, we should think of 
democracy as property of a social habits, interactions and organisations in general: the 
“adjective ‘democratic’ could and should be predicated on patterns of everyday human 
interaction which comply with its normative requirements” (172). 
 
These requirements consist of three generic normative features that Frega ascribes to social 
interactions, namely, relational parity, inclusive authority, and social involvement. Relational 
parity holds when someone’s position in a relationship and the specific content of her role in 
that relationship do not depend on her social status: for example, when the status of citizen 
doesn’t depend on economic standing, gender or race (80). In a democratic society, there is 
no socially or politically privileged caste, class, gender, race, or other group, before whom 
others defer. Inclusive authority requires that people are the authors of the decisions whose 
consequences they will suffer rather than merely passive recipients of these consequences. 
This “all affected” principle does not mean that there cannot be hierarchy in any social 
decision: in the workplace, for instance, Frega allows that “hierarchical patterns of authority 
can be assessed in terms of their democratic quality, which in turn depends on the degree to 
which subordinates are involved in decision processes” (82). Social involvement refers to a 
social unit’s capacity to involve all its members in a plurality of social practices, particularly 
those having to do with a common good. The value of social involvement goes beyond 
formal and material inclusion in decision-making authority to encompass a broader (and 
more diffuse) value of “unrestrained access to social practices and spaces, effective 
integration in social institutions such as the workplace, the neighbourhood, or the educational 
system” and “the concrete experience of belonging to the same social world and having a 
significant position in it” (83).   
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Relationships on these terms have a non-instrumental value for Frega: democracy should be 
pursued, he argues, not “for the sake of other, higher, ends, but is an end in itself” (69). Frega 
rejects not only what he calls instrumentalism, the idea that democratic processes are valued 
for the outcomes (say, peace or non-domination) that they deliver. He also rejects what he 
calls reductivism the idea that democracy is justified by reference to some other more 
fundamental value, such as justice or autonomy. Democracy should have the status of what 
he calls a paradigm value, one which is not valued for the sake of other values that it achieves 
and which acts as a kind of organising concept through which social and political life can be 
understood; “the added value and meaning realized by a democratic society or way of life 
exceeds its mere capacity to instrumentally promote other values such as justice and non-
domination. It resides in realizing a self-contained form of life which is valued for its own 
sake” (86). 
 
If these principles set the normative requirements for democracy, its social location is not 
restricted to a specific set of political procedures or moments of rare collective agency but 
comprises a broad field of practices: an overarching concept that extends “to all domains of 
social life, referring to the ways in which a large variety of social goods, including education, 
health and the quality of the environment are distributed within a society” (73-4). Here too, 
the relevant framework is provided through a threefold classification. Frega’s discussion of 
his core themes is nuanced, distributed and often proceeds through an exposition of others, so 
in extracting some key elements of his social ontology in this way I may be over-simplifying 
or missing important distinctions. In essence, the idea is that the basic ingredients of a 
pragmatist social ontology are habits, interactions, and associational forms or organisations. 
Habits are dispositions to respond to the respond to the world in particular ways (231). Social 
interactions consist in normatively patterned sets of mutual expectations among members of a 
group or communicative community. Social institutions are organisations to promote or 
sustain specific social purposes (such as the family, firm or school): 
As a social concept, democracy denotes a society in which […] three different levels 
are fused together: it refers to a mode of social organization in which a specific set of 
habits is integrated within peculiar forms of social interaction in the structured 
framework of social institutions which are also organized according to democratic 
principles. These three dimensions interact constantly, so that the distinctively 
democratic quality of a social aggregate stems from the positive feedback generated by 
the mutual and beneficial effects of these interactions. None of these dimensions alone 
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is sufficient for a democratic polity to exist. This complex bundle of individual habits, 
patterns of social interactions, and associational forms is the prime referent of a 
pragmatist theory of democracy (134).  
Democracy at the societal level emerges from a particular configuration of underlying 
democratic practice: “A given configuration of habits, patterns of interaction, and 
organizational forms defines the basic structure of society. A democratic society is one in 
which these three dimensions are weaved together in ways that are consistent with the three 
normative principles” (157). 
 
Building as it does not only on pragmatism and sociology but on a wide range of critical 
theory literature in social and political theory, this social ontology of democracy is meant to 
have a critical purchase, to be something we can apply to diagnose problems with, to criticise 
and to revise existing practices:  
Defined in these terms, the concept of democracy has the widest possible application 
and provides a normative standard that operates in all spheres of social life and can be 
used to assess the quality of any form of human association, offering guidance in 
diagnosing social pathologies, identifying positive models of social interaction, and 
devising prospective processes of social emancipation (209).  
Frega goes on to say that for his conception “democracy defines that form of society in which 
all basic institutions from the family to the state and all major organisations from schools to 
firms are organised according to the three principles” (209-10). So (a) democratic theory 
can’t be a freestanding and purely political theory of institutions.  Instead, it is built up with a 
psycho-social theory of habits, a sociological theory of interactions, and organizational theory 
of institutions specify the key ontological elements of this conception. Furthermore (b) 
democracy is a form of society in which all basic institutions are organised in line with the 
three principles. And (c) this provides a normative critical standard for the assessment of 
societies, their practices and institutions. 
 
Seeing democracy as located in a multiplicity of social contexts has the advantage of drawing 
our attention not only to the importance of underpinning ethos and culture for sustaining 
democracy (a very familiar idea, as Frega accepts) but to the range of sites on which struggles 
for democracy can occur. The interwoven character of democracy in Frega’s social ontology 
suggests a stronger claim. Both micro and macro institutions (a school, a democratic society) 
are democratic when habits, interactions and institutional forms relate to each other in the 
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right way. We can consider Frega’s argument in the light of recent thinking in democratic 
theory about so-called deliberative systems, which raises the same kind of issue (e.g., Dryzek 
2010; Mansbridge 1999; Parkinson and Mansbridge 2012). For a systems theorist, such as 
Jane Mansbridge, writing of a deliberative conception of democracy, “the criterion for good 
deliberation should be not that every interaction in the system exhibit mutual respect, 
consistency, acknowledgement, openmindedness and moral economy, but that the system 
reflect those goods” (Mansbridge 1999: 224). If democracy or deliberativeness is a feature 
that distinctively arises at the system level, then it’s not the case that each part needs to be 
democratic: 
A system here means a set of distinguishable, differentiated, but to some degree 
interdependent parts, often with distributed functions and a division of labor, connected 
in such a way as to form a complex whole. It requires both differentiation and 
integration among the parts. It requires some functional division of labor, so that some 
parts do work that others cannot do so well. And it requires some relational 
interdependence, so that a change in one component will bring about change in some 
others […] Normatively, a systemic approach means that the system should be judged 
as a whole in addition to the parts being judged independently. We need to ask not only 
what good deliberation would be both in general and in particular settings, but also 
what a good deliberative system would entail (Mansbridge et al 2012: 4-5) 
A systems perspective suggests that democracy at the system level requires an ordered 
division of labour among the different components, as well as the appropriate feedback loops 
(as Frega says) between them. Yet it doesn’t of course require that each element of the 
system have the characteristics of the whole. 
 
The significance of taking the wide view of democracy, from this holistic perspective, is that 
we don’t restrict ourselves to delineating the supportive functions of habits, and interactions 
for democratic political procedures or institutions but in addition ask the normative question 
of the range of social habits, interactions and organisations whether or not they serve 
democratic functions in the wider societal context (cf. Warren 2017). There is an ambiguity 
in this position. One way of taking the idea that “democracy defines that form of society in 
which all basic institutions from the family to the state and all major organisations from 
schools to firms are organised according to the three principles” is that each institution needs 
to be organised in this way. The presence or efficacy of an organisation that fails to meet the 
requirements of relational parity, inclusive authority, and social involvement necessarily 
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detracts from the democratic quality of the wider society.  It is not obvious that this is always 
right. A pressure group such as Greenpeace, for example, which isn’t inclusive or egalitarian 
in its decision-making, may contribute to improving the democratic quality of the whole by 
introducing ethical considerations for democratic consideration and public debate that would 
have been sidelined otherwise, for example, or by mobilizing a sceptical populace. Insisting 
on the democratisation of these institutions without other compensating changes elsewhere 
may diminish that societal-level democratic quality.! On this microcosmic reading, 
democratic society is incompatible with any undemocratic element. Taken literally, this casts 
democracy as primarily a utopian ideal, not one with much purchase on any actually existing 
social or political form. Perhaps this is right, and we should think of democracy as primarily 
a utopian or ideal set of social relationships (as Dewey arguably sometimes did (Festenstein 
2017)). However, this doesn’t seem to fit with Frega’s overall methodological approach 
rooted in his philosophical inheritance, his project of providing a grounded and sociological 
approach to democratic theory: the elements of his social ontology aren’t the lineaments of an 
ideal democratic blueprint. Rather than finding democracy in a wide range of social 
interactions or as an end-in-view of political action, it would mean we find it nowhere. If 
Frega’s position is that it is only in the context of the whole being democratic that any part 
can be, and vice versa, he paints himself into an even narrower corner than those authors like 
Wolin whom he criticises for envisaging democracy as a fleeting and sporadic achievement. 
Democracy in this sense is very much à venir, an unachievable ideal that may regulate our 
current activity, at least if we (whoever “we” are) can agree on what working toward such an 
ideal requires of us. 
 
On the alternative reading, democracy emerges from the interweaving of habits, interactions 
and organisations. To describe a society (or any selected social unit) as democratic is not to 
say that each organisation within it conforms to the three principles but that the society or 
unit does as a whole. There is a question then of how we deploy Frega’s diagnostic tools, to 
interrogate selected institutions or to examine wider systems. If democratic pathologies are 
pathologies of the whole, then it is an open question whether identifying pathology in a part 
is more or other than identifying the ways in which it may be undermining a democratic 
system. So the primary critical question to ask in this case of (say) a firm, university, school, 
 
! In Festenstein 2018, I discuss the democratic case for the functional value of self-
censorship, which also seems to fit as an instance here: habits that may threaten the 
flourishing of democracy may also support it.  
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or other social institution, is not whether it is itself run in accordance with the three normative 
principles but whether it supports the wider society’s being run in this way.  
 
The second issue to explore concerns the normative scope of Frega’s three principles. Frega 
doesn’t really explore the sense in which democracy is meant to have non-instrumental value 
for everyone in pluralistic societies, including that it is constitutive of their personal self-
fulfillment (127). He seems insensitive to the thought that as an everyday practice for some 
citizens it doesn’t appear that way at all – indeed, to some of us relational equality may feel 
profoundly disruptive of the moral order that gives our lives meaning. Social involvement 
and inclusive authority are demanding and expose us to distinctive risks in our social 
interactions: 
But for this reason perhaps someone will say that the popular state is immensely 
preferable to Monarchy, because in that state, in which of course everyone manages 
public business, everyone has been given leave to publicly display his prudence 
knowledge and eloquence in deliberations about matters of the greatest difficulty and 
importance; and because the love of praise is innate in human nature, this is the most 
attractive of all things to all those who surpass others in such talents or seem 
themselves to do so; but in Monarchy that road to praise is blocked. What is a 
disadvantage, if this is not? I will tell you. To see the proposal of a man whom we 
despise preferred to our own; to see our wisdom ignored before our eyes; to incur 
certain enmity in an uncertain struggle for empty glory; to hate and be hated because of 
differences of opinion (which cannot be avoided, whether we win or lose); to reveal our 
plans and wishes when there is no need to and to get nothing by it; to neglect our 
private affairs. These, I say, are disadvantages. (Hobbes 1998 [1642]: 122) 
Would they be considered as disadvantages in the transformed social setting of wide 
democracy? And if they wouldn’t, how does this matter for agents entangled in the here and 
now? These have been troubling questions most clearly and deeply discussed by the critical 
theory part of Frega’s heritage (e.g., Geuss 1981).   
 
The standard form of response to this kind of question, which is central, for example, to 
Habermas (1996) is that what is being justified by democratic theory at this point is 
specifically the legitimacy of democratic decision-making: it may be contentious or repellent 
for some of our conceptions of the good (and this may in turn create problems for its 
sustainability) but it isn’t intended to be set of universal principles of social association. 
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Rather, the idea is that, if an organisation makes its decisions informed by certain principles 
then its meeting these conditions provides legitimacy for the decisions it reaches, which can 
legitimately be taken to be binding on members, and which are underpinned by the exercise 
of political power.   
 
On this standard view of democratic legitimacy, we can view Frega’s three principles, of 
relational equality, social involvement and inclusive authority, as a set of candidate principles 
for a conception of democratic legitimacy, but it is not obvious that they have purchase on 
every social organisation, since not every organisation seeks to have the kind of binding force 
on its members that requires legitimation to back it up. It is not clear if the aspiration of 
Frega’s wide view is to present a transformed and extended vision of democratic legitimacy 
or, more generally, of a morally justified form of society. If the former, the view seems 
restricted to those units that raise the normative question of legitimacy. If the latter, then it 
seems important to explain why this wide view has purchase in circumstances of extensive 
moral pluralism. 
 
Anyone committed to understanding the challenges and promise of contemporary democratic 
theory will benefit hugely from engaging in depth with Frega’s magisterial book. Even if it 
raises deep questions, this reflects the importance of the territory it covers and the vital 
contribution it makes to mapping that territory. 
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